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This paper attempts to identify the relative efficiency of housing corporations in the Netherlands,
making use of a panel dataset running from 2001 until 2010 covering the entire population. Like
for most organizations in the public sphere, the production process of corporations is not
straightforward. It should be classified as a two-stage process whereby in stage 1 the
organization facilitates a service that is put into use in stage 2. Therefore, several concepts of
performance measurement are available, depending on the viewpoint we take and the
accompanying choice of output and input measures. In this paper, we distinguish between the
concepts of ‘economic’ and ‘social’ efficiency as measures of performance. Economic efficiency
refers to the management of the housing stock of corporations, whereas social efficiency focuses
on the attainment of their social goals. We conduct a Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate and
compare results of various sub models. In general it is found that substantial differences in
efficiency appear, so that there seems to be scope for efficiency gains in the Dutch social housing
sector.
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2I Introduction
The Dutch social housing market is dominated by housing corporations;1privately governed
organizations executing a set of public tasks. In 2010, nearly 2.3 million dwellings were in the
hands of corporations. This boils down to nearly 75% of the rental housing stock or35% of the
total housing stock.2From an international viewpoint, these figures are remarkably
large.According to Priemus (2002), no country in the European Union even comes close to this
figure. Also, in a recent survey, Whitehead and Scanlon (2007) show that among a subset of
European countries, the Netherlands have the highest percentage of social housing. Moreover,
because nearly all social housing is in the hands of corporations, the conclusion is easily drawn
that their performance and execution of tasks is of vital importance to the Dutch housing market,
and, therefore society.In order to determine the drivers of success or failure of corporations, the
first exercise is to map their performance. However, measuring the performancewithin a public
sector is more complicated than it is for a private sector, because public institutions often provide
a diffuse set of goods and services which are hard to compare and measure.3
Estimating the performance of (organizations within) the public sector has received more and
more attention throughout the recent past. In general, performance is evaluated along two
dimensions; effectiveness and efficiency (see Priemus 2003). Effectiveness is defined as the
extent to which certain goals are achieved, whereas efficiency questions whether the production
process of the organization doesn’t spoil resources (inputs). An organization running optimally
should perform well along both lines.
Most empirical literature presents one measurement exercise that deals with the concepts of
efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously. Efficiency is then defined as the ratio between
weighted output and weighted input.Typically, empirical literature of this kindeither attempts to
measure efficiency of entire governmental bodies, such as municipalities (see for exampleGeys
and Moesen(2009) or Geys et al.(2010)) or focuses on one specific sector, such as health care
(Borge and Haraldsvik, 2009) or road maintenance(Kalb, 2010) for example.The first type of
research nearly always suffers from the constraint that data availability is limited. Therefore, the
choice ofinput and especially output measures used to estimate productivity and efficiency may
be dependent on the datasets that are available.
This research attempts to measure the performance of housing corporations, thereby focusing on
one specific sector: social housing.The need for a coherent measurement of corporations has
increased because of their augmented autonomy throughout the last decades. A number of
corporations have been put in the spotlights due to incidents4, and the question rises whether or
not social housing can actually be executed in a setting without direct intervention from the
government. Because of these incidents, the Dutch central government aims to control and
monitor the sector more stringent and thereby enhance efficiency. A proposal has been accepted
that effort should be done on moderating the costs in the social housing sector. The explicit goal
1 The terms housing association or housing society are sometimes used as well. In judicial terms, corporations are either foundations or associations.
2 Sources: CorpoData and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
3For an elaborate discussion on measurement issues in the public sector, see Stevens (2005).
4 There has been a sequence of reports of integrity violations. Furthermore, decision failures have caused billions of euros losses on high-risk projects and finance.
3is formulated that operational costs should remain constant for at least four years.5 The question
arises whether or not such a narrow based policy can be justified. Therefore we broaden this
narrow measure of cost efficiency to find a basis on which corporations could be judged.
Because the dataset we obtained allows us to choose various combinations of performance
measures, we are able to identify their robustness by comparing different submodels and
disentangling the different concepts of efficiency. Note also that knowledge about housing
corporations isinformative on a large scale, becausethey have a dominant position in the housing
market.Therefore, this paper attempts to map the efficiency of corporations by making use of a
broad panel dataset running from 2001 until 2010.
Dutch housing corporations are in a unique position as they are private institutions, executing a
set of public tasks. However, despite of their private character, they are relatively unaffected by
the discipline of the market (Koolma, 2008). Also, direct control from central or local
government is lacking, especially on issues like efficiency.6Indeed, the ties between government
and corporations have loosened throughout the recent past, both administrative and financially.
Finally, supervision, both internal and external, appears to be ineffective,or at least insufficient to
prevent the incidents that have tainted the sector in the recent past (see Koolma, 2012).
Therefore, Koning en Van Leuvensteijn (2010) characterize the position of Dutch corporations
as the ‘Bermuda triangle of management’. Koolma and Gerrichhauzen (2011) prefer the more
favorable description‘community based organizations with a legitimacy based upon mutual
confidence with stakeholders’. No matter how the position is phrased, it is clear that because of
theirhigh degree of autonomy, efficient and effective execution of tasks is not self-evident.
For non-profit organizations, theory of voluntary sector failure is postulated by Salomon (1987),
a theory which is the subject of an ongoing debate (Anheier & Ben-Ner, 2003). The interaction
between nonprofit sectors and national governments is regarded as a critical success factor. In
non-scientific comments the reported errors in the Dutch case have been attributed to
amateurism, remarkably one of the four philanthropic failures in the theory of Salomon. Several
authors argue that nonprofit organizations have a function in situations of both government and
market failure, and claim that these organizations can be more efficient than state and market if
they choose a well-balanced way of operation (Enjolras, 2000; Dollery & Wallis, 2004).
However, the absence of a straightforward maxim and the inheritance of philanthropic
weaknesses make them vulnerable to loss of efficiency and effectiveness.
As noted, it is hard to map the ‘production’ process of organizations in the public sphere.
Corporations are of no difference in that respect. As for most public institutions, the production
process could be classified as a two-stage process (see De Witte and Geys, 2011) where in the
first stage the corporation has to create the facilities that can serve the public, such as building
and maintaining a proper and sufficient-quality housing stock. In the second stage, actual supply
and demand are being brought together so that (hopefully) the social goals that corporations are
ought to pursue are attained. Steps one and two together, then, lead to the outcome (satisfaction
of inhabitants). In addition, corporations conduct activities so as to combine housing and care, or
increase livability in the neighborhoods. Figure 1 presents this process in simplified form.
5Ministry of National and Kingdom Affairs (2013).Letter to the chairman of the House of Parliament, subject: operational costs corporations. 24-01-2013.
6Schilder et al. (2006) indicate an absence of control on internal efficiency and overpayment for resources in the institutional design.
4Figure 1.‘Production’ process of housing corporations
The paper is set up as follows. Section II summarizes previous research on the performance of
housing corporations. Section III briefly describes the institutional background of social housing
in the Netherlands. Section IV discusses the method of Data Envelopment Analysis. In section
V, we elaborate upon our choice of input and output measures. Empirical results of the efficiency
measurement are given in section VI. Section VII briefly discusses how to control for exogenous
variables whereas section VIII relates efficiency scores to cost levels. Section IXfinally,
concludes.
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5II Previous research
Research attempting to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of Dutch housing corporations
is scarce. Indeed, Priemus (2003) states that we cannot really justify any kind of reform within
the social housing market because in the current situation “we are under-informed about the
efficiency of housing corporations” (pp. 269). There have been a few attempts to fill this hiatus
and conduct empirical assessments.
De Graaf et al. (2001) conduct a Data Envelopment Analysis (see below) on a subset of housing
corporations in 1998 in order to measure the ‘policy efficiency’ of corporations. Policy
efficiency - as opposed to economic efficiency - focuses on the question whether social goals are
attained in the cheapest possible way. Therefore, this approach takes the two stages of figure 1 in
one time, covering both the concepts of economicand social efficiency. The authors conclude
that a large part of corporations is performing optimally and the gains that can be achieved by the
other corporations are minimal. However, the researchers acknowledge that these results should
be interpreted with caution. They argue that data availability should be improved in order to
refine measures of inputs and outputs. De Graaf et al. also note that, because corporations are not
given explicit goals to accomplish, it is hard to quantify their performance. Finally, their method
of data revision and processing reduces the dataset to a small sample, containing only ten percent
of the population. This raises the question whether the conclusions still stand by using a more
extended dataset and a slightly different specification.
Our method differs in four ways from the research of De Graaf et al. (2001). First of all, this
paper uses a broad panel data set covering ten years of data instead of one cross-section.
Secondly, our method of combining municipal-and postal code-data sources with the dataset of
corporations is different, leaving the entire population of corporations intact.Thirdly, we attempt
to examine multiple concepts of performance, by disentangling the economic and social
efficiency of corporations.Fourth, we propose a different specification of certain output
parameters.
Hakfoort et al. (2002) incorporate the aforementioned research in a broader project attempting to
give an overview of the social housing sector and the role of corporations. They conclude that
the current environment will not automatically give the right incentives to perform efficiently.
This statement is thus somewhat conflicting with the results of the actual efficiency scores found
by De Graaf et al. (2001), which were relatively high.7
Koolma (2008,2010) presents a set of general findings that support the notion that efficiency in
the social housing sector could be enhanced. First of all, Koolma identifies a rise in
organizational costs per dwelling since 2002. Secondly, these costs are positively correlated to
the size of corporations. After a merger, costs are structurally higher as well. The question rises
whether this increase in costs can be justified by an increase in service levels. A third important
finding is that land and dwellings are being bought above market prices. It seems that their
comfortable financial position has led corporations to be ‘overrelaxed’ in their purchasing
7 In principle the two findings can be reconciled with each other. As a Data Envelopment Analysis focuses on relative efficiency, it could still be the case that the
differences in efficiency are small, whereas the sector as a whole is operating inefficiently. Intuitively however, one would expect that if efficiency is low in absolute
terms, relative efficiency scores should reveal a substantial spread.
6practices. Indeed, Gruis et al. (2008) state that a healthy financial position may be a ‘blessing as
well as a curse’ (pp. 15). Finally,Koolma notes, investments of corporations do not track
forecasts in housing market conditions, that is, local shortages or surpluses of dwellings are not
always taken into account adequately.Thus corporations do not seem to feel the direct pressure
from the market. Koolma(2008) also acknowledges that differences between corporations in their
cost levels and investment patterns are quite substantial. We would therefore expect to see at
least substantial variation in efficiency scores.
This study contributes to previous research by adopting a coherent view on performance
measurement of housing corporations.Corporations are obliged to file their financial and
operational statements, the formats of which are prescribed by law. These accountability reports
are checked and put in a database by the central state agency Central public housing fund
(CentraalFondsVolkshuisvesting, CFV).This agency has provided us with a dataset that
comprises the entire population. Robustness is tested along the lines ofmultiple subdatasets using
different performance indicators.
III Institutional background
Dutch housing corporations are in a rather unique position being private institutions in judicial
terms, but facing the statutory obligation of executing public tasks. The number of housing
corporations active in the Netherlands rose rapidly since the founding of the housing act
(Woningwet) in 1901. From the very beginning, there were political concerns about the
efficiency of the voluntarily controlled organizations, resulting in strict accounting prescriptions
and the obligation to set rents in accordance with market levels. The housing act made it possible
for corporations to receive governmental support, under the condition that the organization was
only acting in the public interest. State support was gradually reduced throughout the years,
however, and the ties between government and corporations have been loosened ever since. The
so-called balancing and grossing act (Bruteringsoperatie8, Ouwehand and Van Daalen, 2002) in
1995, which converted state loans and future subsidy obligations to lump sums, was the most
fundamental reform in forcing the corporations to stand on their own feet. With this operation,
state support in the form of subsidies ceased to exist. The lump sum conversion has been very
profitable to the housing corporations (Van der Schaar, 2003), and so induced cash windfalls in
the sector (Koolma, 2008).
State aid is currently limited to a few areas where corporations can get a special treatment over
private parties(European Commission, 2009). For example, loans to corporations are guaranteed
by the guarantee fund social housing (WaarborgfondsSocialeWoningbouw, WSW). If necessary,
the government will act as a last resort. This guarantee fund ensures that loans can be undertaken
at favorable interest rates. Also, in some occasions local governments sell land at a discount to
corporations as part of social policy (De Kam 2012). Currently, the only source of direct
subsidies or grants to corporations is the central fund. These subsidies are only provided under
special circumstances however, for example when a corporationfaces severe financial problems.
8 Officially, this act is entitled as ‘Wet balansverkortinggeldelijkesteunvolkshuisvesting’, but ‘Bruteringsoperatie’ is the most often used term.
7Operationally, the ties between government and corporations are loose as well. The onlybinding
condition that has to be fulfilled is that all resources of the corporation should be employed in
public housing.If a corporation fails to meet these requirements, its status of registered institution
can be withdrawn by royal decree.9In 1993, central government formulated a set of public tasks
or ‘performance fields’ with guidelines by means of thesocial housing management
decree(BesluitBeheerSocialeHuursector, BBSH). This decree is not binding and can be
interpreted at own insight. The total set of tasks has been broadened throughout the years. The
most recent version of the BBSH encompasses the following seven performance fields, on which
corporations should focus their operations.
1. Adequate housing of the target group, that is, persons with incomes within the
boundaries of the rent benefit.
2. Preserving the quality of the housing stock.
3. Preserving financial continuity.
4. Improving livability of the neighborhoods.
5. Providing housing and fostering services to the elderly, the disabled or other persons that
are in need of care or guidance.
6. Giving renters the opportunity to get involved with policy and administration.
7. Conducting business in a frugal and efficient way.
The first six performance fields all deal with effectiveness: they reveal which goals should be
pursued by the corporations. The final field reveals that efficient application of resources is of
importance as well. However, this set of tasks does not give the corporations a blueprint for how
to operate. Corporations can freely determine which tasks to give priority. Therefore, it is not
possible to give the BBSH-goals a priori weights. Also, there exist no explicit minimum
performance levels or targets. Therefore, these goals do not provide clear guidelines that can be
used to compare corporations’ performance. The only comparison material, are the corporations
themselves. In addition, the central government encourages corporations to interpret the tasks
with a degree of freedom by taking into account the specific characteristics of the environment
and geographical region in which they operate.
Next to the more general tasks as laid down in the BBSH, corporations sometimes make explicit
agreements with the municipalities in which they are active. In this way, they are able to tailor
their output to local demand and adjust their decisions in conformity with local policy. The share
of corporations that has indeed made such agreements has decreased between 2002 en 2005, but
increased sarply from 2005 onwards (Severijn 2010). In 2010, 273 out of 401 corporations (68
percent) have made agreements with the relevant municipalities. Again, however, these
agreements are not legally binding. Thus, whether or not these agreements are made,
corporations do not face sanctions for not meeting the requirements. Overall, then, the
framework in which corporations are operating leaves them a high degree of autonomy.
9Housing Act, article 70, clause 2.
8This high degree of autonomy leads Conijn (2005) to conclude that proper measurement of
efficiency is impossible. First of all, he states, the BBSH gives so much scope for interpretation
that a measuring rod with which to compare the corporations’ output is not available. This
critique is actually the core problem of all efficiency measurement exertions in the public sector.
As noted above, all autonomously operating bodies lack a clear objective, so that it is up to the
researcher to choose proper measures of input and output. Indeed, municipalities, for example,
face an even higher degree of autonomy compared to corporations. The main problem is
however, that the fields of the BBSH can be operationalized via multiple measures. Therefore,
one always has to consider different sets of outputs so as to check for robustness.
Secondly,Conijn argues, because costs cannot be ascribed to separate activities, it is impossible
to map cost efficiency. This problem can be solved or at least alleviated by using methods of
frontier estimation. We argue, therefore, that the measurement of efficiency among corporations
is not an insurmountable hurdle. It is, however, important to keep in mind that such research is
by definition sensitive to the specification of models. Therefore, this paper uses several
robustness checks.
IV Methodology
In the literature on efficiency measurement, the method of frontier analysis is the most common.
Frontier analysis can be both non-parametric,for example Data Envelopment Analysis(DEA) and
parametric,for example Stochastic Frontier Analysis(SFA). Both methods share the feature that
they construct a best practice frontier on the basis of the data used by the researcher. For reasons
explained below, we choose the non-parametric method of DEA as basis of our analysis.
Data Envelopment Analysis was introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) who based their method on
the ideas of Farrell (1957). The method constructs the best practice frontier of a group of
decision making units (dmu’s) by solving a set of linear programming problems. This frontier
gives all combinations of inputs and outputs that are deemed to be efficient. Consequently, every
dmuis compared to this frontier to determine its efficiency. If admu is on the frontier, it is said to
be efficient.The further away from the frontier the less efficient it is.The best practice frontier
thus consists of the envelopment of all the efficient dmu’s. The inefficient dmu’slie inside the
frontier.
The linear programming problem in the input oriented setting, following the notation of
Coelli(1996),reads:
݉ ݅݊ ఏ೔ǡఒߠ௜
ݏǤݐǤ
ܺߣ൑ ݔ௜ߠ௜
ܻߣ൒ ݕ௜
ߣ൒ Ͳ
9Where ߠ௜denotes the efficiency score of dmui, ݔ௜ and ݕ௜are respectively, the input and output
vectors of dmui. ܺand ܻ are the input and output matrices for the entire set of dmu’s. Finally, λ is 
a vector of weights to be determined in the optimization problem, so that ܺߣ and ܻߣ is the
weighted sum of, respectively, inputs and outputs of a ‘virtual dmu’. In the model, we thus
search whether there exists a possibility to ‘defeat’ dmui, by constructing a virtual dmu, being a
linear combination of all existing dmu’s.
The virtual dmu needs to meet the requirements that it produces at least as many outputs and
uses no more inputs compared to dmui. If we fail to construct a virtual dmu that meets these
requirements, the efficiency score obtains its maximum value of 1. The efficiency score ߠ௜ then
reveals by how much total input of dmui could decrease without decreasing output. It could be
interpreted, as a ‘measure of defeat’. Not only does the virtual dmu succeed in producing the
same amount of output as dmui, it needs only a fraction of ߠ௜of inputs for it. Thus, an efficiency
score for a dmu of 0.75 means that all its inputs could be reduced by 25 percent. In a similar
way, one could also choose an output orientation where the efficiency score can be interpreted as
the percentage with which output could increase without decreasing input.
Note that we do not impose any weights on inputs and outputsbeforehand. That is, because
different inputs and outputs cannot always be added up or compared a priori, the model
determines the weights that the virtual dmu receives. It is in general, however, possible to
construct an extra constraint on the weights. We could for example allow for variable returns to
scale (VRS) technology, as opposed to the constant returns to scale (CRS) approach, by adding
the constraint:
ܰߣ ͳԢൌ ͳ
Where ܰͳis a vector of ones.We will consider both a VRS (input-oriented) and a CRS
specification.
V Data and output of the BBSH-fields
In our measurement of efficiency, we will consider two concepts of efficiency: narrow
(economic efficiency) or broad (social efficiency). We define economic efficiency as the extent
to which the housing stock portfolio is being managed in an economic and frugal way (i.e. stage
1 in the production process, see figure 1). Social efficiency questions whether the social (BBSH-)
goals are achieved efficiently (i.e. stage 1 and 2 in the production process). The
operationalization of stage-1 is quite straightforward (see section VI); stage 2 is more demanding
and complex. Therefore, this section presents potential output parameters for the BBSH-fields.
As described above, corporations have considerable leeway in choosing their policies. The only
binding constraint is that all operations should be aimed at ‘serving the public interest’. There
exist general guidelines (BBSH), but corporations are encouraged to design their activities in
such a way that local circumstances are taken into account. Whether or not corporations make
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agreements with local governments is up to the parties involved. We have obtained a dataset
from CorpoData, which is a cooperation scheme in which several parties in the social housing
market request data from the corporations.10 Our dataset enables us to choose from a wide range
of possible input and output measures.
In order to measure performance, we need to determine along which lines we judge corporations.
The goals formulated in the BBSH are the most apparent as they hold for the entire population of
corporations. The BBSH encourages both efficient and effective provision of services. As noted,
the BBSH consists of seven performance fields. The first six of concern social goals
(effectiveness).The final BBSH performance field deals with efficiency. Below we will first
discuss the possible measures of performance for each of the BBSH fields. Hereafter we will
return to the problem of measuring efficiency.
1. Adequate housing of the target group, that is, persons with incomes within the
boundaries of the rent benefit
One should note here that this field covers two dimensions. First of all, corporations should
preferably house persons within the target group, that is; persons with income below the
threshold of the rent subsidy.11 Secondly, persons should be housed adequately,meaning that the
rent they pay has to be aligned with the income they earn. To put it simple, low-income earners
should be housed in low-rent dwellings, high-income earners in high-rent dwellings. Defining
the target group as low-income earners, each client can be classified in one of the following four
categories.
A. Low income earnershoused adequately
B. Low income earners housed inadequately (too expensive)
C. High income earners housed adequately
D. High income earners housed inadequately (too cheap)
This leads to the following four outputs.
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤଵ ൌ ܮ݋ݓ݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑ ܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕ
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤଶ ൌ ܮ݋ݓ݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀݅݊ ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕሺݐ݋݋݁ݔ݌݁݊ ݅ݏ ݁ݒ ሻ
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤଷ ൌ ܪ݅݃ ݄݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕ
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤସ ൌ ܪ݅݃ ݄݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀݅݊ ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕሺݐ݋݋݄ܿ݁ܽ ݌ሻ
One could debate about which outputs should be counted in social efficiency measurement. That
is, it is questionable whether housing of high income groups essentially is a ‘good thing’. For
example, one might argue that housing high income earners in cheap dwellings (category D)
does more harm than good. Indeed, this inadequate housing prevents persons with a low income
to live in there, which may result in queuing up. Housing high income earners can be justified
however if the dwelling would otherwise remain vacant, or if this is done to prevent segregation
of neighborhoods.
10 CorpoData is a collaboration ofthe WSW, CFV and the ministry of national and kingdom affairs (Ministerie van BinnenlandseZaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, BZK).
11 For single person households, the threshold income of the rent subsidy in 2011 is € 21,625 (age below 65) or 20,325 (age over 65). For multi person households this
is € 29,350 (<65) and € 27,750 (>65).
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To test for robustness we will consider threeways of dealing with the separate categories. The
first option is toinclude all four outputs separately.The second one only includes the first two
outputs (housing of the target groups). The third option is to include all four categories, but add
an a priori value judgment on the relative importance of the categories. In this particular case, we
impose the value judgment that housing of the first category is superior to the second, the second
is superior to the third en the fourth category is least preferred.12
Note however that theseoutputs arenot complete enough to cover the first field of performance,
because they only deal with allotments in year t; that is, they reveal the number of new clients.
Many dwellings however, will simply berented by the same households as in year t-1. Therefore,
we construct an additional measure, namely the total numberof renewed or continued contracts.
This is approximated by outputܤܤ ܵܪଵǤହ13
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤହ ൌ ܰݑ݉ ܾ݁ ݎ݋݂ ݅݊ ݄ܽ ܾ݅ ݁ݐ ݀݀ݓ݈݁ ݈݅݊݃ݏെ ݈ܽ ݋݈݉ݐ ݁݊ ݐݏ݅݊ ݁ݕ ܽݎݐ
2. Preserve the quality of the housing stock.
We will choose two different points of view to measure the quality of the housing stock. First of
all, quality can be measured by means of characteristics of the dwellings. The so-called housing
valuation scheme (Woningwaarderingsstelsel, WWS)assigns points on the basis of,for
example,the number of rooms, the quality of the kitchen, and the size of the house. A higher
score means a better quality.
ܤܤ ܵܪଶ௔ ൌ ܣ݁ݒ ܽݎ ݃ ݁ݍݑ݈ܽ ݅ݐݕ݌݋݅ ݊ݐݏܹ ܹ ܵ
Quality could alternatively be measured using housing prices.14 One should note however that
not only the quality of the dwelling influences itsvalue, but so does the location. We will
therefore correct the values of the dwellings for the price of the location. That is, the value of
dwellings in areas with above (below) average land prices will be corrected downwards
(upwards).
ܤܤ ܵܪଶ௕ ൌ ܣ݁ݒ ܽݎ ݃ ݁ܽݒ ݈ݑ ݁݋݂ ݀ݓ݈݁ ݈݅݊݃ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ݎ ܿ݁ݐ ݀݂݋ݎ݈݋ܿ ܽ݅ݐ݋݊
3. Preserve financial continuity.
The Central public housing fund formulates two kinds of judgments concerning the financial
position of corporations, the ‘judgment of solvability’ and the ‘judgment of continuity’. The first
judgment reveals whether the current solvability is satisfactory, the second indicates whether
solvability is sufficient in order to conduct the operations that are planned for the future. For
current solvability, we use solvability in year t as an output. For continuity we use the forecasted
solvability in year t + 5, which comprises the effects of scheduled operations from year t + 1 up
and until year t + 5.
12One should note that the value judgment of the second and third group remains arbitrary as both categories fulfill one of the two requirements of the first BBSH-
performance field. In our specific preference structure, we implicitly assume that housing low-income groups is more important than housing adequately.
13The extent to which existing contracts between corporations and tenants consist of adequate housing is beyond the control of the corporation. For example, if the
income of an existing tenant increases beyond the threshold of the rent subsidy, he or she cannot be forced to move out by the corporation.
14 In the Netherlands, all houses are being valued by means of the Act ‘Valuation real estate’ (Wet Waarderingonroerendezaken, Woz). Our dataset contains the Woz-
values of all dwellings of the corporations. We have however excluded the years 2001-2004 from our analysis, because data for these years was incomplete.
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ܤܤ ܵܪସ௔ ൌ ݋݈ܵ ܽݒ ܾ݅ ݈݅ݐݕ݁ݕ ܽݎݐ
ܤܤ ܵܪସ௕ ൌ ܨ݋݁ݎ ܿܽ ݏ݁ݐ ݀ݏ݋݈ ܽݒ ܾ݅ ݈݅ݐݕ݁ݕ ܽݎݐ൅ ͷ
Note, however that the judgment of the CFV does not account for the trend in solvability, while a
negative trend could be an indicator for threatened continuity on the long run. In spite of a
sequence of unexpected financial breakdowns of housing corporations in the last 3 years, the
CFV has not (yet) changed the formalized method of judgment. Therefore, we stick to the two
indicators of the CFV.
4. Improve livability of the neighborhoods.
Since 1997, corporations are not only responsible for their own dwellings and tenants, but for the
quality of living in the neighborhoods in which they hold possession as well. The most
straightforward measure of output is an aggregate score of livability. Note however, that simply
taking this score of livability as output may not be adequate. Corporations of course are only
partly responsible or accountable for the livability in their neighborhoods. Other factors, which
are exogenous to the corporations, such as the level of criminality or municipal expenditures may
be of influence as well. Indeed, we would prefer to know what the corporation adds to livability
in the neighborhood. As a first option, the change rather than the level in livability could be
chosen as performance indicator. This is appropriate as long as exogenous circumstances remain
fairly constant.
ܤܤ ܵܪହ௔ ൌ ο݅ܮ ܽݒ ܾ݅ ݈݅ݐݕ15
This score on livability originates from the so-called ‘Leefbaarometer’ (‘livabilometer’), made
available by the Ministry of national and kingdom affairs.16 The livabilometer gives both a
general score of livability and separate scores on six subdimensions. These subdimensions are
(1) the composition of population, (2) social relationships, (3) public space, (4) safety, (5) level
of facilities and (6) housing stock.17 The last dimension is the one on which corporations
probably have most influence as it measures the extent to which the housing stock is balanced
concerning the types and ages of the dwellings. If we only take into account this sub-dimension,
and thus remove the dimensions which are (largely) exogenous to corporations, we are left with
the measure over which corporations have the most control.
ܤܤ ܵܪହ௕ ൌ ݅ܮ ܽݒ ܾ݅ ݋݈݉ ݁݁ݐ ݎܿݏ ݋݁ݎ ݋݊ ݄݋ݑ݅ݏ݊݃ݏݐ݋ܿ ݇
5. Provide housing and foster services to the elderly, the disabled or other persons that are
in need of care or guidance.
This field (which has been added to the BBSH in 2001) shows a certain overlap with the first
field. Indeed, in the first field we already take into account the housing of persons aged over 65
with low incomes, as they simple belong to the target group. One could argue therefore that the
15 The outputs accompanying the fifth BBSH field have been transformed so as to yield the necessary positive output parameters for all observations.
16Because data on livability is presented on postal code level, we converted the measures to the scale of corporations by means of taking a weighted average. Data are
available for the years 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2010.
17 These subdimensions are further divided into 49 indicators. These indicators include both (subjective) judgments of inhabitants and measures on their actual
behavior.
13
target group should be split into two sub-targetgroups: (1) low-income people (age <65) and (2)
the elderly (irrespective of income). Outputs 1.1-1.4 could then be reformulated:
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤଵᇱൌ ܮ݋ݓ݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑ ܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕሺ൏ ͸ͷሻ
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤଶᇱൌ ܮ݋ݓ݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀݅݊ ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑ ܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕሺ൏ ͸ͷሻ
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤଷᇱൌ ܪ݅݃ ݄݊݅ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑ ܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕ (<65)
ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤସᇱൌ ܪ݅݃ ݄݅݊ ݋ܿ݉ ݁݁ ܽ݊ݎ ݁ݎݏ݄݋ݑ݁ݏ ݀݅݊ ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑ ܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕሺ൏ ͸ͷሻ
And we add:
ܤܤ ܵܪହǤଵ ൌ ܪ݋ݑ݅ݏ݊݃݈݁݀ ݈݁ݎ ݕܽ݀ ݁ݍݑ ܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕ
ܤܤ ܵܪହǤଶ ൌ ܪ݋ݑ݅ݏ݊݃݈݁݀ ݈݁ݎ ݕ݅݊ ܽ݀ ݁ݍݑ ܽ݁ݐ ݈ݕ
Further, ܤܤ ܵܪଵǤହ could be split up, i.e. we distinguish between ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’
dwellings. Special dwellings are those suitable for housing of the elderly and handicapped.
Ordinary dwellings are all other houses.
ܤܤ ܵܪହǤଷ ൌ ݊ܫ ݄ܾܽ ݅݁ݐ ݀݊ݑ݉ ܾ݁ ݎ݋݂ Ԣ݋݀ݎ ݅݊ ܽݎݕԢ݀ݓ݈݁ ݈݅݊݃ݏ
ܤܤ ܵܪହǤସ ൌ ݊ܫ ݄ܽ ܾ݅ ݁ݐ ݀݊ݑ݉ ܾ݁ ݎ݋݂ Ԣݏ݌݁ܿ ݅ܽ ݈
ᇱ݀ݓ݈݁ ݈݅݊݃ݏ
Finally, corporations also play a role as intermediary party in the arrangement of housing, health
care and well-being contracts between health care suppliers and clients of corporations.
Therefore, we also include:
ܤܤ ܵܪହǤହ ൌ ܰݑ݉ ܾ݁ ݎ݋݂ ݄ ݁ܽ ݈݄ݐ ܿ ܽ݁ݎ ܽݎܽݎ ݊݃݁݉ ݁݊ ݐݏ
6. Give renters the opportunity to get involved with policy and administration.
The active involvement of tenants could be reflected by (annual) meetings between the
corporation’s administration and (representatives of) its tenants.One should note however, that
every year only one or two percent of the corporations fails to organize these meetings.
Therefore, the spread in this measure is low. Moreover, whether or not meetings are organized
provides only verylimited information on the extent to which renters have a say in corporations’
policymaking. Unfortunately, however, better data is unavailable. Therefore, we have decided to
exclude this performance field from our measurement.
7. Conduct business in a frugal and efficient way.
The final BBSH-field tries to incorporate the notion that corporations should not spoil resources.
This is where efficiency measurement comes into play. This is the actual goal of our research,
and will be elaborated upon in the next section.
Concluding, we assign output measures to the first five BBSH-fields only. Table 1 summarizes
descriptive statistics for the abovementioned measures.
Opmerking [JV1]:
Rik: jij had bewijs dat grote corporaties die
wel meetings organiseren juist lager scoren
op klanttevredenheid? Kun je dat ergens
aantonen? Of heb je dat ergens
gepubliceerd?
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of BBSH performance measures (pooled data)
BBSH field Performance measure N Avg St. dev Min Max
Housing of target
groups (1)
1.1 (Housing low income earners adequately)
1.2 (Housing low income earners inadequately)
1.3 (Housing high income earners adequately)
1.4 (Housing high income earners inadequately)
3970 320.98 548.75 0 5187
3970 23.67 64.88 0 1104
3970 120.22 209.80 0 2565
3970 24.27 50.66 0 897
1.5(number of inhabited dwellings minus allotments) 3964 5440.18 9028.89 0 74230
Quality of
dwellings (2)
2a (average points WWS)
2b (average value of dwellings corrected for location,
in 1000 euro’s)
3865 131.92 13.57 59 211
2277 166.74 35.83 15.57 314
Financial continuity
(3)
3a (solvability year t)
3b (solvability year t+5)
3592 0.49 0.17 0.09 1.20
3985 0.49 0.22 0.01 4.82
Livability (4) 4a     (Δlivability) 
4b (score on housing stock)*
1580 0.48 5.40 -47.14 88.05
1585 0.90 20.41 -49.19 45.59
Housing and care
(5)
5.1 (number of elderly people housed adequately)
5.2 (number of elderly people housing inadequately
5.3 (number of ordinary dwellings)
5.4 (number of special dwellings)
5.5 (number of health care arrangements)
3970 63.45 122.89 0 2412
3970 9.74 30.49 0 807
3965 4692.03 7992.50 0 69797
3965 752.31 1701.18 0 41861
4009 222.64 1370.17 0 26174
* The score on the housing stock can vary from -50 to 50.
VIModel specification and resulting efficiency scores
As noted, we take two points of view in measuring efficiency: narrow and broad.We define
economic efficiency as the extent towhich the housing stock portfolio is being managed in an
economic and frugal way (i.e. stage 1 in the production process, see figure 1).Social efficiency
questions whether the social (BBSH-) goals are achieved efficiently (i.e. stage 1 and 2 in the
production process). Below, we will create models for both viewpoints.
Stage-1 efficiency
In thefirst set of models (models i and ii), we focus on stage 1 of the production process only.
That is: we try to answer the question whether or not the housing stock is being acquired and
managed efficiently.
Model i focuses on the management of the existing housing stock, that is, the relation between
the total quality and quantity of the existing stock and the costs incurred to acquire this. We
assume that the costs of the existing stock are represented by the level of depreciation and
changes in value of assets,and interest payments. Also, maintenance costs are included.As
outputs we take the total dwelling stock as starting point. This stock can however be splitted into
different subcategories via a number of ways. First of all (model ia), we distinguish between
‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ dwellings as defined above, where again; special dwellings are defined
as those suitable for housing the elderly and/or handicapped and ordinary dwellings are all other
houses. Secondly (model ib), we distinguish on the basis of rental prices (cheap, affordable or
expensive). Finally (model ic), we distinguish between physical characteristics of dwellings
(single-household dwellings, multi-households dwellings, high-rise dwellings, units in nursing
homes, and other).
Model ii focuses on the separate building and demolishingactivities of the corporations. As
outputs we use both the number of newly built dwellings as well as the total net present value of
these dwellings. Also, the total number of demolished dwellings is included.As inputs we use,
Opmerking [JV2]:
Dit deel blijft het struikelblok.
Onderaan dit bestand staat hierover een
uitgebreid commentaar.
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the costs of acquiring the ground, the buildings costs and demolishing costs. Dwellings are
separated into rental dwellings, units in nursing homes and dwellings for sale. Table 2
summarizes the specifications of the stage-1 models.
Table 2. Inputs and outputs model i and ii.
Model i Model ii
ia ib ic
Outputs -Number of ‘ordinary’ dwellings
-Number of ‘special’ dwellings
-Quality of dwellings (WWS)
-Number of cheap dwellings
-Number of affordable dwellings
-Number of expensive dwellings
-Quality of dwellings (WWS)
-Number of single household
dwellings
-Number of multi-household
dwellings (no elevator)
-Number of multi-household
dwellings (elevator)
-Number of high-rise dwellings
-Number of units in nursing homes
-Other
-Number of newly built dwellings
-Net present value of newly built
dwellings
(3 separate categories)
-Number of demolished dwellings
Inputs -Depreciation*
-Interest payment
-Maintenance costs
-Depreciation
-Interest payment
-Maintenance costs
-Depreciation
-Interest payment
-Maintenance costs
-Ground costs
-Building costs
-Demolishing costs
* For 2005-2009, expected depreciation is used rather than real depreciation.
Stage-12 efficiency
The second set of models (I-VI) broadens the definition of efficiency, letting the BBSH-fields act
as outputs. In this way, we are measuring ‘social efficiency’ (or as De Graaf et al. (2001) coin it,
policy efficiency). That is, we answer the question whether or not corporations attain there social
goals in the most efficient way. We now thus broaden our view and take stage 1 and stage 2 of
the production process in one time (see figure 1). As outputs, we use the performance measures
based on the BBSH-fields as these reveal the social objectives of the corporations. Because the
BBSH-fields allow for different performance indicators, several specifications of output choices
are possible.
Model I focuses merely on the first two(core) BBSH-fields (i.e. provide housing of sufficient
quality to the target group). As noted, we will consider threesub models. Model Ia includes all
allotment categories, while model Ib includes only the allotments of low-income groups and
thereby disregards the high income groups. Model Ic finally imposes a priori weight constraints
on the categories. All subsequent models are elaborations of the basemodel Ia. ModelIIonly
slightly alters the base model by including an alternative measure of quality. Model IIIa
(IIIb)includes the solvability in year t (t+5). Model IVa includes the change in livability, whereas
model IVb includes only the livability score on the housing stock. Model V distinguishes
between housing of the young and elderly and includes health care arrangements. Model VI
finally considers an alternative input measure.
For models I-V, we use as inputs (1) operational expenditures18, (2) interest payments and (3) all
other costs. This final entry is simply the difference between total costs and operational
expenditures. Model VI finally, omits capital expenditures so that operational expendituresis the
18Operational expenditures is the sum of (1) wages and salaries, (2) maintenance costs and (3) other operational expenditures.
Opmerking [JV3]:
Dit zit me eigenlijk niet helemaal lekker,
dat we voor 2005-2009 gebruik moeten
maken van expecteddepreciation. Heeft Rik
enig idee of expectedand real depreciation
redelijk overeen komen? Je zou zeggen, het
is één van de best te voorspellen
kostenposten.
Als alternatief kunnen we ook ‘gewoon’
gebruikmaken van totale kosten.
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only input. Because capital expenditures are fixed for a great part, and may show extreme
outliers we exclude them in the final model as a robustness check. For details on the models I-VI,
see table 3.
For all the above mentioned (sub)models, we use DEA as method of determining efficiency. As
noted above, the production function in the public sector is hard to identify explicitly, because
the process consists of multiple stages (see figure 1). Also, the functional form of the production
process is unclear, so that a parametric estimation may easily be misspecified. Therefore it is
hard to estimate the true production function, so a non-parametric method like DEA is preferred.
Table 3.Inputs and outputs models I-VI
Outputs (BBSH) Model Ia,Iband Ic(basic
BBSH model)
Model II
(alternative
quality score)
Model IIIa and
IIIb(include
solvability)
Model IVa and
IVb (include
livability)
Model V
(include housing
and care)
Model VI
(alternative
input)
Housing of target
groups (1)
1.1
1.2
1.3 (Ia only)
1.4 (Ia only)
(Ic with a priori weights)
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.1’
1.2’
1.3’
1.4’
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2
Quality of
dwellings (2)
2a 2b 2a 2a 2a 2a
Financial continuity
(3)
3a or
3b
Livability (4) 4a or
4b
Housing and care
(5)
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
Inputs -Interest expenditures
-Operational expenditures
-Capital expenditures
-Operational
expenditures
The results of the DEA analyses are presented in Table 4.Clearly, all models indicate that
(substantial) efficiency gains can be attained. The different specifications can be reconciled with
each other fairly well, as mostaverage scores for the CRS (VRS) models fluctuate around 0.75
(0.65). Model V is the most prominent outlier, showing the highest efficiency scores. All models
classify only a minority of the corporations as fully efficient. Overall then, the results stand in
contrast to the findings of De Graaf et al. (2001) who find hardly any inefficiency.
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Table 4. Results of DEA analyses
Average efficiency Standard deviation % fully efficient Minimum efficiency
Model N t DEA CRS DEA VRS DEA CRS DEA VRS DEA CRS DEA VRS DEA CRS DEA VRS
ia 368 8 0.53 0.67 0.18 0.19 6% 13% 0.25 0.30
ib 371 8 0.67 0.75 0.17 0.18 9% 18% 0.06 0.07
ic 333 8 0.73 0.82 0.17 0.16 15% 29% 0.30 0.36
II 188 4 0.66 0.74 0.17 0.19 6% 20% 0.32 0.31
Ia 322 10 0.66 0.81 0.19 0.15 11% 24% 0.31 0.38
Ib 322 10 0.60 0.77 0.19 0.16 7% 16% 0.28 0.35
Ic 322 10 0.61 0.79 0.18 0.16 6% 19% 0.20 0.20
II 330 6 0.59 0.80 0.20 0.16 10% 24% 0.22 0.36
IIIa 341 9 0.64 0.81 0.19 0.16 10% 23% 0.29 0.38
IIIb 320 10 0.66 0.81 0.19 0.15 11% 24% 0.31 0.38
IVa* 330 9 0.65 0.82 0.19 0.15 10% 26% 0.31 0.42
IVb* 312 10 0.57 0.75 0.19 0.19 7% 20% 0.21 0.27
V 307 10 0.77 0.89 0.17 0.13 20% 41% 0.41 0.49
VI 266 10 0.55 0.72 0.17 0.20 3% 14% 0.20 0.23
- VRS scores are input oriented.
* Because models IVa andIVb contain transformed outputs, it is inconvenient to use CRS-DEA. See Pastor (1996).
Table 4 shows average results for the entire period 2001-2010. Figure 2 indicates how the
scoresevolve over time. It appears that throughout the years, the average efficiency scores are
stable, except for model VI which shows a downward dip in 2008.
Figure 2.Average relative efficiency scores throughout the years*
* For expository reasons, not all models are included in the figure
Table 5 shows the correlation scores of the different VRS-models.Correlations between the
‘social’ efficiency models (I-VI) are without exception high (never below 0.48). However, it
appears that being socially efficient, is no direct guarantee of economic efficiency, as the
correlation scores between models i-ii on the one hand, and models I-VI on the other, are not
constantly high. Correlation does remain positive however, among all combinations
of(sub)models.
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Opmerking [JV4]:
Ik heb voorzichtig ook wat getest met de
methode SFA. Correlaties zijn niet hoog
tussen DEA en SFA (ca 0.35).
Maar nogmaals, SFA is in dit geval een
beetje fragiel en dubieus om te gebruiken.
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Table 5. Correlation of the VRS*scores
ia ib ic ii Ia Ib Ic II IIIa IIIb IVa IVb V VI
ia 1 0.71 0.77 0.29 0.58 0.62 0.49 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.47 0.53 0.41
ib 1 0.67 0.25 0.50 0.52 0.43 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.37 0.43 0.34
ic 1 0.15 0.54 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.42 0.54 0.39
ii 1 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.22
Ia 1 0.89 0.70 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.76 0.82 0.61
Ib 1 0.76 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.66 0.72 0.54
Ic 1 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.53 0.59 0.54
II 1 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.73 0.77 0.59
IIIa 1 0.98 0.95 0.77 0.81 0.61
IIIb 1 0.94 0.76 0.82 0.61
IV 1 0.74 0.79 0.58
Va 1 0.68 0.48
Vb 1 0.52
VI 1
* Correlations of CRS scores are similar (not shown).
VII Correcting for exogenous variables
To some extent, inefficiency is beyond the control of the decision making unit, because it is
being (dis)advantaged by exogenous circumstances. Therefore, efficiency scores that are not
corrected for relevant exogenous variables might be misspecified. One should thus keep in mind
that the average efficiency score given cannot be judged directly by its magnitude. It is however,
beyond the scope of this paper to fully analyze which exogenous variables are relevant and to
what extent all the efficiency scores would alter if we were to take these into account. Rather, the
goal of this paper has been to compare different concepts of efficiency and different
(sub)datasets.To get a grip on this issue however,we correct model Ia for exogenous variables.
To account for these background variables we use the method of Ruggiero (1998). First of all,
we have estimated the relationship between several background variables, and the efficiency
score for our base model (Ia) by running the regression:
ܧ݂݂ ݅ܿ ݅݁݊ ܿݕ(ܽܫ )19 ൌ ߚ଴ + ෍ ߚ௥ݖ௥ோ
௥ୀଵ
൅ ߝ
whereݖ௥ is a potentialexogenous variable to be taken into account. Taking a 5% significance
level as cut-off, the only variables that significantly influence efficiency are the quality of the
ground (positive) and the level of urbanity (negative)20. Secondly, a variableܼ is created that
indicates to what extent a corporation is (dis)advantaged.
ܼ ൌ ෍ ߚ௥ݖ௥
ோ
௥ୀଵ
In our case,ܴ ൌ ʹ , because only the quality of the ground and the level of urbanity are
considered. In this case, a smaller ܼ indicates that a DMU is advantaged. Finally, we rerun the
first-stage DEA analysis, adding the constraint.
19 As dependent variable we use the single-bootstrapped DEA scores. See Simar and Wilson (2007).
20 Excluded variables are: safety in the neighborhoods (from the livabilometer), a dummy variable for having possession in proximity of the coast and the share of
minorities in the region.
Opmerking [JV5]:
Sectie VII en VIII heb ik toegevoegd omdat
ik het anders wat kaal vond. Gevaar is wel
dat je afwijkt van de kern. De vraag is dus,
wat moeten we behouden van deze secties
en wat niet?
Eventuele andere toevoegingen die het
geheel verrijken zijn ook welkom.
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ߣ௝ ൌ Ͳ݂݅ ܼ௜൐ ௝ܼ
This yields the following scores, shown in table 6.By definition, the efficiency scores are
corrected upwards, since the disadvantaged corporations (those with worse exogenous
circumstances) are given the advantage that they cannot be compared to corporations that face
superior circumstances. It appears that on average, efficiency scores only moderately change.
The results still indicate that efficiency gains that can be accomplished are substantial. The
correlation between the original Ia specification, and the one corrected for background variables
is very high (0.97), which is reassuring.
Table 6. Model Ia corrected for exogenous variables
Model N t Average
efficiency
Standard
deviation
% fully
efficient
Minimum
efficiency
Ia (VRS) 335 10 0.81 0.15 24% 0.38
Ia (corrected for
background
variables)
335 10 0.84 0.15 29% 0.45
VIII Efficiency and cost levels
As noted, an often heard policy instrument to increase efficiency in the social housing sector is to
encourage corporations to lower their (operational) costs. The question of course arises to what
extent lowering costs comes at the expense of lowered service provision and thereby is harmful
for tenants. Consequently, we might ask ourselves whether the level of costs informs us about
the efficiency. Table 7 briefly informs us about this issue by relating efficiency scores with
(absolute and relative) cost levels. It appears that higher costs lead to higher efficiency scores
(the variables with absolute cost levels show positive signs throughout the analysis). Therefore,
in as far as reducing costs implies scaling down activities, efficiency is not necessarily enhanced.
The results indicate that indeed, increasing costs are being accompanied by more than
proportionate increases in output. The variables expressing costs per dwelling have negative
signs throughout the analysis however. It seems therefore that policy could best be oriented at
reducing (or prevent increasing) relative cost levels.
Opmerking [JV6]:
Dezelfde vraag als bij de vorige comment:
wel of niet doen?
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Table 7.Tobit regression results21
Dependent variable is VRS specification of model:
ii ii ii Ia Ia Ia V V V
Wages 0.013
(6.68)***
0.013
(9.40)***
0.012
(7.51)***
Wages per
dwelling
-0.088
(1.76)*
-0.290
(11.41)***
-0.285
(9.64)***
Operational costs 0.003
(6.91)***
0.002
(8.78)***
0.002
(7.01)***
Operational costs
per dwelling
-0.045
(2.88)***
-0.116
(22.41)***
-0.107
(17.87)***
Total costs 0.002
(6.43)***
0.001
(8.10)***
0.001
(5.38)***
Total costs per
dwelling
-0.020
(4.05)***
-0.055
(26.86)***
-0.048
(20.30)***
Oad 0.00005
(3.67)***
0.00005
(3.90)***
0.00006
(4.13)***
0.00003
(3.24)***
0.00003
(3.85)***
0.00003
(3.76)***
0.00001
(0.97)
0.000009
(0.82)
0.00001
(1.20)
Ground quality 0.037
(0.52)
0.058
(0.78)
0.032
(0.44)
-0.136
(3.05)***
-0.024
(0.56)
-0.100
(2.27)***
-0.184
(3.52)***
-0.076
(1.45)
-0.146
(2.71)***
Proximity to
coast
-0.044
(1.38)
-0.044
(1.35)
-0.044
(1.37)
-0.013
(0.62)
-0.002
(0.12)
-0.016
(0.52)
0.025
(1.07)
0.041
(1.74)*
0.025
(1.00)
Share of
minorities
-0.080
(0.20)
-0.053
(0.13)
-0.139
(0.35)
-0.097
(0.37)
-0.006
(0.02)
-0.052
(0.20)
-0.213
(0.73)
-0.164
(0.56)
-0.133
(1.18)
Constant 0.63
(7.14)
0.69
(7.54)***
0.68
(3.46)***
1.04
(20.53)***
1.04
(21.24)***
1.04
(21.29)***
1.21
(20.23)***
1.20
(20.56)***
1.19
(19.86)***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 736 708 737 3194 2828 3194 3045 2694 3045
Absolute z-values (tobit model) between parentheses. * (**) (***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) confidence level.
IX Conclusion
Because the production process of public institutions is hard to map accurately, so is the
measurement of their effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, because in many occasions the
availability of data is limited, results are hard to interpret properly. This paper has attempted to
identify the performance of Dutch housing corporations, by focusing on different concepts of
efficiency. By disentangling the production process, we compare both economic efficiency
(stage 1) and social efficiency (stage 12). It is comforting to see that slight changes in output
parameters do not alter results dramatically as correlations between the different subsets are
relatively high. Correlation between stage-1 and stage-12 efficiency is somewhat lower however.
Overall, no matter which specification we adopt, it appears that at least substantial efficiency
gains should be attainable by the Dutch social housing sector. Indeed, as long as one observes
differences in relative efficiency scores, per definition we have inefficiency in absolute terms as
well. The non-efficient corporations in relative terms certainly have room for improvement, but
it is not per se the case that the fully efficient corporations have nothing to gain. Therefore, the
generally accepted notion that efficiency could be enhanced in the social housing sector is
supported. Moreover, it appears that in general, increasing cost levels of corporations are being
accompanied by more than proportional increases in service provision. Therefore, policies based
on cost reduction in absolute terms may do more harm than good. Further research is needed to
find whether there exist structural differences between efficient and non-efficient corporations,
so as to provide guidelines of how to improve (social) performance within the sector.
21 Regressions with bootstrapped efficiency scores are not shown but show similar results.
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Bij comment JV2, zie pagina 15.
Dit deel blijft het struikelblok, er zijn nog wat knopen door te hakken.
Mijn eigenlijke plan (idealiter) was om 5 verschillende efficiency scores te berekenen:
1. Efficiency in onderhoud
Output: aantal woningen verbeterd of gerenoveerd, toename in kwaliteit van bezit
Input: kosten aan onderhoud en verbeteringen
Onderdeel 1 leidt tot vreemde uitkomsten. Erg lage scores. Dat is ook weer niet zo heel
vreemd, aangezien je amper rekening kunt houden met de grootte van het onderhoud. Er
is alleen onderscheid tussen verbeteringen van minder en meer dan 20.000 euro. Een
goede output ontbreekt dus.
2. Efficiency in Bouwen:
Output: Aantal woningen gebouwd, bedrijfswaarde van die woningen
Input: Grondkosten, bouwkosten woningen
Onderdeel 2 is goed te doen en lijkt me ook het belangrijkste. (Wel alleen data voor
2007-2010).
3. Efficiency in slopen:
Output: Aantal gesloopte woningen
Input: Sloopkosten
Evt correctie voor locatie (OAD, slechte bodem)
Onderdeel 3 is alleen maar te doen in combinatie met onderdeel 2. Sloopkosten bevatten
ook kosten voor bouwrijp maken e.d. zodat je onderdeel 2 en 3 moeilijk uit elkaar kunt
trekken.
4. Efficiency in kopen
Output: Aantal gekochte woningen, bedrijfswaarde van die woningen
Input: Prijs waarvoor woning gekocht is (evt. gecorrigeerd voor locatie)
Onderdeel 4 leidt ook tot zeer lage efficiency scores (gemiddeld 0.10!!!). Wellicht komt
dit door een paar extreme outliers in de data. Er hoeft maar 1 corpo te zijn die heel lage
kosten maakt (of de kosten toeschrijft naar een ander jaar).
5. Efficiency in verkopen
Output: Aantal verkochte woningen, Prijs verkochte woningen
Input: verkoopkosten
Evt. correctie voor locatie
Onderdeel 5, idem aan onderdeel 4.
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Conclusie: onderdelen 1, 4, en 5 zijn niet goed uit te voeren. Merk ook op dat het deels de
volgende oorzaak heeft. Als je slechts 1 input hebt, maar wel een hele grote dataset (ca400
Dmu's), krijg je over het algemeen erg lage efficiency scores. Dit komt omdat er in een lijst van
400 DMU's altijd wel eentje is met een heel lage input. Dit is een zogenaamde outlier. Zo zijn er
corporaties bij die nauwelijks sloopkosten hebben, maar wel een redelijk aantal woningen
slopen. Zo een corporatie is dan de benchmark voor de rest. Dwz, de rest wordt altijd verslagen
door deze corporatie. Het kan zijn dat die data gewoonweg fout is, of dat de input in een ander
jaar als kostenpost verantwoord is. Hoe dan ook verstoort dit de uitkomsten.
Je hebt methodes om met DEA outliers te vinden, maar dit is geen routinewerk wat je zomaar
even voor veel modellen doet. Je moet steeds opnieuw de DEA analyse uitvoeren. Bovendien
heb ik hierbij weer een ander programma nodig. Ik vermoed dat het wel kan met een programma
dat we al hebben overigens.
Kortom, als er tijd is, is het bouwverhaal iets wat nog wat uitgebreider aandacht verdient.
Voorlopig kom ik niet veel verder dan modellen ia,ib,ic en het model ii, voor bouwen en slopen.
Maar, mocht iemand van jullie denken dat efficiency in (1) onderhoud, (4) inkoop, (5) verkoop
wel degelijk is in te passen, wellicht met iets andere input/output maatstaven, dan hoor ik het
graag.
______________________________________________
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